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ABSTRACT — Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. Philosophers have recently built 
an impressive case that the norm of  assertion is factive. That is, you should make an assertion only if  it is true. Thus 
far the case for a factive norm of  assertion been based on observational data. This paper adds experimental evid­
ence  in favor of  a factive norm  from  six studies.  In these studies, an assertion’s truth value dramatically affects 
whether people think it should be made. Whereas nearly everyone agreed that a true assertion supported by good 
evidence should be made, most people  judged that a false assertion  supported by good evidence  should not be 
made. The studies also suggest that people are consciously aware of  criteria that guide their evaluation of  assertions. 
Evidence is also presented that some intuitive support for a non­factive norm of  assertion comes from a surprising 
tendency people have to misdescribe cases of  blameless rule­breaking as cases where no rule is broken.
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1. Introduction
Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cog­
nitive  beings.  By asserting  we  share  information,  co­
ordinate behavior, and advance collective inquiry. Be­
cause assertion is so important, it is unsurprising that it 
is governed by cognitive or epistemic norms. Some as­
sertions should be made and some should not. But what 
distinguishes  the  ones  that  should  be  made  from the 
ones that shouldn’t? In short, what is the norm of  asser­
tion? Should any false assertions be made? Or should 
we make an assertion only if  it is true? In short, is the 
norm of  assertion factive?
Over the past decade, in philosophy there has been 
an explosion of  interest in the norms of  assertion, all 
aimed at answering the question, what is the norm of 
assertion? Experimental cognitive science hasn’t directly 
addressed the question, but some have indicated that 
they think the answer is straightforward. For example, 
consider  this  recent  passage  by  two leading cognitive 
scientists:
[L]anguage  is  not  only  conventional  in  the 
sense  of  involving  socially  shared  arbitrary 
sound­meaning assignments; language is a rule­
governed,  normatively  structured  practice. 
Given the conventional  rules that constitute a 
language,  there  are  appropriate  and inappro­
priate,  right  and  wrong  uses  of  the  linguistic 
devices in making speech acts (with assertions, for  
example, being governed by norms of  truth) that apply 
to all speakers, including the self, in an agent­
general manner. (Rakoczy and Tomasello 2009: 
205; emphasis added)
Rakoczy and Tomasello then report a fascinating ex­
periment designed to test whether children as young as 
2 years old can ‘differentially track kinds of  mistakes’ 
for  different  types  of  speech  act,  in  particular  com­
mands and assertions. When it comes to assertion, the 
researchers treat  falsity as ‘inappropriate’, ‘wrong’, and 
meriting  ‘normative  intervention’  even  by  a  child’s 
lights (209–10). In short, even a 2­year­old can be ex­
pected to recognize that assertion has a factive norm.
Rakoczy, Tomasello and perhaps many others think 
it’s obvious that assertion’s norm is factive,  and, as we 
shall see momentarily, an impressive case has been built 
in support of  a factive norm. Nevertheless, many claim 
to fnd a factive norm counterintuitive and propose al­
ternative accounts. They argue that truth is too strong 
of  a standard and that the relevant standard is instead 
what you believe to be true or what you have good evidence 
for. Consider Grice’s famous Maxims of  Quality, whose 
‘Supermaxim’ is,  ‘Try to make your contribution one 
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that is true,’ and whose sub­maxims are, ‘1. Do not say 
what  you  believe  to  be  false.  2.  Do not  say  that  for 
which  you  lack  adequate  evidence’  (Grice  1989:  27). 
Here the emphasis is on avoiding mendacity and on ad­
equate evidence for the truth of  an assertion, not truth 
per se.  Sperber and Wilson (2012: 49, 47) go one step 
further than Grice and contend that our linguistic prac­
tices are governed by ‘no maxim of  truthfulness at all.’ 
In light  of  such disagreement,  it’s  no trivial  question 
whether assertion’s norm is factive.
Although there has been no experimental work in 
this area, empirical considerations have shaped the de­
bate over assertion’s norm, albeit at a fairly high level of 
abstraction. If  assertion is indeed a rule­governed activ­
ity — as virtually everyone agrees that it is — then we 
should  look  to  the  behavior  of  competent  language 
users as a guide to what the rules are. Of  course, asser­
tion doesn’t come with a rule book any more than nat­
ural languages come with grammar guides. Nor do we 
expect competent language users to have an explicit, ar­
ticulable theory about the rules of  assertion any more 
than we expect them to have such a theory about the 
rules  of  syntax.  But  we can gain evidence  about  the 
rules of  assertion by looking for distinctive patterns in 
two related areas: the normal give­and­take surround­
ing assertion and competent speakers’ normative intu­
itions  about  assertions.  It  is  an  empirical  matter 
whether  such patterns exist  and,  if  so, what  they are 
like.
Consider  the  primary  case  made  for  the  leading 
theory in this area, the knowledge account of  assertion, which 
says  that  knowledge  is  the  norm of  assertion.  Since 
knowledge requires truth, knowledge is ipso facto a fact­
ive norm. The best and most widely recognized evid­
ence for the knowledge account is an explanatory argument  
from  linguistic  patterns (Williamson  2000,  Turri  2010b, 
Turri 2011a). I can’t canvass all the relevant evidence 
here, but in order to give the reader an idea of  why the 
knowledge account has gained so much support, I will 
briefly discuss the most suggestive data points.
First, one way of  prompting someone to make an 
assertion is to ask, ‘What time is it?’. But an equally ef­
fective,  and  practically  interchangeable,  prompt  is  to 
ask, ‘Do you know what time it is?’. Competent speak­
ers  respond  to  the  two  questions  similarly.  But  why 
would that be? Proponents of  the knowledge account 
explain it as follows. Because knowledge is the norm of 
assertion, my question ‘Do you know what time it is?’ 
enables you to infer that I want you to make the relev­
ant assertion and, thus, functions as an indirect request for 
you to make the assertion. This is similar to how my 
question ‘Can you pass the salt?’ can function as an in­
direct request for you to pass the salt.
Second, when you’re asked a question, even if  the 
question has nothing to do with you or what you know, 
it is normally okay to respond by saying, ‘Sorry, I don’t 
know.’ Suppose you’re asked, ‘What is the conversion 
rate from liters to quarts?’, and you respond, ‘Sorry, I 
don’t  know.’  Normally,  your  response  will  be  judged 
perfectly acceptable. But you and your epistemic state 
are irrelevant to the content of  the question, so why is 
that  response  any  more  acceptable  than,  say,  ‘Sorry, 
Paris is the capital of  France’ would be? Proponents of 
the knowledge account explain it as follows. By saying 
‘Sorry, I don’t know’, you’re informing the questioner 
that you lack the appropriate normative standing to an­
swer her question, which is surely relevant in the con­
text.
Third,  when  you  make  an assertion,  even if  the 
content of  your assertion has nothing to do with you or 
what you know, it is normally appropriate to ask you, 
‘How do you know that?’.  What  explains  the default 
propriety  of  this  response?  Proponents  of  the  know­
ledge account explain it as follows. By making an asser­
tion,  you represent yourself  as satisfying the norm of 
assertion; and knowledge is the norm; so the question is 
appropriate  because it asks  whether  you’re  accurately 
representing yourself.
Fourth,  asking ‘How do you know?’ is understood 
as implicitly challenging my authority to make an asser­
tion. More aggressive than asking ‘How do you know?’ 
is  ‘Do you really  know that?’.  More aggressive  yet  is 
‘You don’t know that!’ or ‘You don’t know what you’re 
talking about’. What explains this range of  aggressive­
ness? Proponents of  the knowledge account explain it 
as follows. ‘How do you know?’ implicitly challenges my 
authority to assert Q, by asking me to demonstrate that 
I do in fact have it; ‘Do you really know that?’ explicitly 
challenges my authority, by questioning whether I have 
it; and ‘You don’t know that!’ explicitly rejects my au­
thority.  Explicitly  questioning  someone’s  authority  is 
more aggressive than implicitly questioning it, and ex­
plicitly rejecting someone’s authority is more aggressive 
than explicitly questioning it.
Fifth, assertions of  the form ‘Q, but I don’t know 
that/whether Q’ strike us as inconsistent. But their con­
tent is perfectly consistent, so why do they seem incon­
sistent? Proponents of  the knowledge account explain it 
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as follows. Knowledge is the norm of  assertion, so in or­
der to properly assert a conjunction of  the form, ‘Q, 
but I don’t know that/whether Q’, you must know each 
conjunct.  But  your  knowing  the  frst  conjunct  (‘Q’) 
would  falsify  the  second  conjunct  (‘I  don’t  know 
whether Q’), in which case you couldn’t possibly know 
the conjunction. And by asserting the conjunction, you 
represent yourself  as knowing it (because you represent 
yourself  as satisfying the norm of  assertion). So by as­
serting the conjunction, you represent yourself  as know­
ing something that you couldn’t  possibly know, which 
explains the inconsistency. In a word, what you assert is 
inconsistent with how you represent yourself.
In sum, the overall case for the knowledge account 
is impressive, based on data gleaned from social obser­
vation and introspection.  These data have acted as a 
leash, fruitfully constraining as well as inspiring the the­
oretical debate. But it’s quite a long leash (Turri 2013). 
It would be useful to add to our data set relevant obser­
vations  tempered  by  proper  controls.  This  paper  ac­
complishes  that by testing whether people’s judgments 
about cases better ft a factive or non­factive norm of 
assertion. The results support the view that the norm is 
factive.
Before proceeding, I should say a few words about 
the sort of  normativity at stake in the debate over asser­
tion’s norm, and a word about how the various propos­
als have been framed. I begin by characterizing the sort 
of  normativity  at  stake and contrasting  it  with  other 
sorts of  normativity.
For  the  most  part,  when  theorists  ask  what  the 
norm of  assertion is, they have something very specifc 
in mind. They want  to know what rule or rules help 
constitute the practice of  assertion, make that form of 
activity possible. They are interested in constitutive norm­
ativity  (Searle  1969,  Searle  1979,  Brandom  1983, 
Rescorla 2009). Constitutive norms or rules are internal 
to and distinctive of  a practice. Consider chess as an ex­
ample. Chess is the game that it is precisely because it 
has the rules that it does: the rules help constitute the 
game  of  chess,  and  distinguish  it  from  other  board 
games,  such  as  checkers.  On  the  current  approach, 
something similar is true of  assertion: assertion is the 
speech act that it is precisely because it has the rule that 
it  does. When someone performs a  particular  speech 
act and that speech act is an assertion, what makes it an 
assertion rather than something else, such as a guess, 
conjecture  or  guarantee,  all  of  which  have  the  same 
‘direction  of  ft’  as  assertion  (Anscombe  1957,  Turri 
2010a)? One answer is that assertion is individuated norm­
atively (Williamson 1996). Assertion is the unique speech 
act  that  has  a  certain  standard  of  correctness,  more 
stringent than that of  guessing, less stringent than that 
of  guaranteeing.  This  standard  of  correctness  is  the 
norm of  assertion.
Constitutive  normativity  differs  from  moral  and 
prudential normativity. For example, a particular move 
might be allowed by the rules of  chess even if  making 
that move would be immoral or imprudent because, say, 
your opponent is a child who will be devastated by the 
ensuing crushing defeat, or because your opponent is a 
short­tempered mobster who will break your fngers if 
you checkmate him. Similarly, the constitutive norm of 
assertion might allow assertions which are nevertheless 
forbidden by other norms. For example, it might be il­
legal in a certain country to assert that the emperor has 
no clothes, just as it might be illegal or imprudent to 
checkmate  the  emperor  in  a  game of  chess.  But  the 
norms that prohibit these assertions are not norms  of  
assertion;  they  are  not  norms  that  help  constitute  the 
practice of  assertion. Rather, they are norms that hap­
pen to pertain to particular assertions.
For  these  reasons,  those  who  favor  a  non­factive 
norm of  assertion aren’t content to point out that some­
times we should,  in  some sense of  ‘should’,  say some­
thing false, or that sometimes we should, all things con­
sidered, say something false. To object on such grounds 
is merely to confuse a more generic sense of  ‘should’ 
with the ‘should’ associated with the norm of  assertion. 
Such confusion is akin to noting that in some circum­
stances you should move your rook diagonally — say, 
on pain of  torture, or because it will drive your oppon­
ent to distraction — and concluding that therefore the 
rules of  chess allow the rook to move diagonally.
The  literature  on  assertion’s  norm  suffers  from 
some  terminological  inconsistency.  What  is  the  right 
way to express assertion’s constitutive norm? Some say, 
‘You should make an assertion only if  . . .’; others say 
‘You ought to make an assertion only if  . . . ’; others say, 
‘You may make an assertion only if  . . .’; and others say, 
‘You must: make an assertion only if  . . .’.  (See Turri 
2013 for more on the variety.) I’m not going to resolve 
this inconsistency here. Instead, I will simply opt for the 
‘should’  formulation.  And  when  probing  laypeople  I 
will stick to asking about what a speaker ‘should’ say or 
whether anything ‘incorrect’ has been done. It is legit­
imate to question whether different terminology would 
lead to different results. But choices must be made in 
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order  to  get  the  project  off  the  ground  and  I  have 
chosen to start here. I welcome and encourage further 
work that makes different choices.
1.1. A synopsis of  competing accounts
Theorists have defended two main factive accounts of 
assertion’s norm:
The truth account: you should assert Q only if  Q 
is true. (Weiner 2005)
The knowledge account: you should assert Q only if 
you know Q.  (Unger 1975,  Williamson 2000, 
Hawthorne 2004, Schaffer 2008, Turri 2011a, 
Benton 2011)
The  knowledge  account  is  a  factive  account  because 
knowledge  requires  truth.  (There  has  recently  been 
some  controversy  over  this.  See  Hazlett  2010,  Turri 
2011b,  Hazlett  2012,  and  Buckwalter  ms.) I  have 
already explained the main argument for the knowledge 
account. For the remainder of  this paper, I will simply 
ignore the differences between the two specifc factive 
accounts, focusing instead on the factive genus.
Theorists have defended two main non­factive ac­
counts of  assertion’s norm:
The belief  account:  you should  assert  Q only  if 
you believe Q. (Bach and Harnish 1979, Bach 
2008)
The justifcation account: you should assert Q only 
if  believing  Q is  justifed  (or:  reasonable)  for 
you. (Douven 2006, Lackey 2007)
Belief  isn’t factive, because you can believe some­
thing false. And virtually everyone agrees that justi­
fcation isn’t factive either, because it seems obvious 
that  you  can  be  justifed  in  believing  something 
false. That is, fallibilism about justifcation is almost 
universally accepted (Friedman and Turri in press; 
Friedman  and  Turri  under  review;  Sutton  2007 
dissents).
Justifcation  is  fallible  only  if  it  is  possible  to 
have a justifed false belief. To be clear, this is only 
a  necessary  condition,  not  a  suffcient  condition. 
To avoid near­total skepticism about justifcation, 
something  much more  than  the  mere possibility is 
needed.  Pairing  the  justifcation  account  with  an 
infallibilist conception of  justifcation or an overly 
demanding fallibilist conception would completely 
undermine the primary motivation for a justifca­
tion account.
1.2. Two counts against factive accounts: intu­
ition and argument
Two objections  have led  many to reject  a  factive ac­
count and in its place endorse a justifcation account. 
Researchers who follow this path endorse a non­skep­
tical,  fallibilist  conception  of  justifcation.  (Note:  al­
though the justifcation account and truth account are 
logically compatible, so too is it logically consistent to 
reject one and accept the other. Researchers who fnd 
the following two objections persuasive do just that.)
The frst objection is simply that there are straight­
forward  counterexamples  to  factive  accounts.  The 
counterexamples follow a recipe: a protagonist has good 
evidence  for  believing  Q,  believes  Q  on  that  basis, 
thereby gaining a justifed belief  that Q, which he then 
gives voice to by asserting Q. Now simply add to the 
story that,  despite the good evidence,  Q is false  and, 
thus, the assertion is false.  Taken to the extreme, the 
protagonist is a radically deceived brain­in­a­vat some­
how able  to  make  assertions,  perhaps  by  wiggling  a 
parietal lobe. (Compare Douven 2006: 477, and Lackey 
2007: 607.) Factive accounts entail that the protagonist’s 
assertion is incorrect. Opponents of  factive accounts re­
port having a strong intuition that such justifed or reas­
onable false assertions are not incorrect qua assertions.1 
Call this the  non­factivity intuition and theorists who en­
dorse it non­factivists.
The second objection is a simple argument about 
justifed false assertions. I will understand the argument 
to go like this: a speaker who makes a justifed false as­
sertion  is  not  thereby  properly  criticizable  or  blame­
worthy; so the speaker has probably not broken a norm 
of  assertion; so assertion probably doesn’t have a factive 
norm  (Lackey 2007:  603,  597;  Douven 2006:  476–7; 
Hill and Schechter 2007: 109).
The  following  experiments address  both  ways  of 
resisting factive accounts: the non­factivity intuition and 
the argument from blamelessness to correct behavior.
2. Experiment 1A
Do competent speakers generally share the non­factiv­
ity intuition? Or does their assessment reflect an impli­
cit commitment to the opposite  factivity intuition, to wit, 
that a false assertion is ipso facto an assertion that should 
1 ‘Qua assertion’ because,  as explained  earlier,  everyone 
agrees that they might be incorrect according to other 
rules that aren’t constitutive of  assertion, such as legal, 
prudential or moral rules.
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not be made? This section reports a very simple initial 
experiment to help answer these questions.
2.1. Participants, materials and procedure
Sixty­six participants (36 female, aged 18–60 years,  M 
= 32,  SD =  12  years)  were  recruited  using  Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and paid $0.20 for approximately 2–3 
minutes  of  their  time.  Participants  were  located 
throughout the United States and 97% listed English as 
a native language. Participants were not allowed to take 
the survey more than once. I excluded data from 5 par­
ticipants who failed a comprehension question designed 
to ensure that they were reading the scenario carefully 
enough. But including these participants in the analysis 
yielded  the  same  pattern  of  results  described  below. 
Participants were not allowed to re­take any survey and 
participants  who  had  taken  previous  similar  surveys 
were excluded by their AMT Worker ID.  The proced­
ure  for  recruiting  and  compensating  participants  was 
the same for each of  the experiments reported below.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of  two 
conditions: True and False. Participants read the follow­
ing story (alternate text in brackets and separated by a 
slash):
Maria is a watch collector. She owns so many 
watches that she cannot keep track of  them all 
by memory alone. So she maintains a detailed 
inventory of  them. She keeps the inventory up 
to date.  Maria  knows  that  the  inventory  isn’t 
perfect, but it  is extremely accurate. ¶2 Today 
Maria  is  having  guests  over  for  dinner.  Soon 
after dinner is served,  one of  her guests asks, 
“Maria, do you have a 1990 Rolex Submariner 
in your watch collection?” ¶ Maria consults her 
inventory.  It  says  that  she  does  have  a  1990 
Rolex Submariner in her collection. [But this is 
one of  those rare cases where the inventory is 
wrong: she does not have one /And this is just 
another  case  where  the  inventory  is  exactly 
right: she does have one].
In both the False and True conditions, Maria is justifed 
in thinking that she has a 1990 Rolex in her collection. 
She is justifed for the same reason in each condition: 
because of  an entry in the inventory that she knows to 
be  extremely  reliable.  On most  standard accounts  of 
justifcation,  Maria’s  justifcation  is  equally  strong  in 
both conditions. She has fallible but nevertheless very 
2 Indicates paragraph break on the participant’s screen.
good justifcation for thinking that the watch is in her 
collection. Any difference between the two conditions 
cannot plausibly be explained by saying that Maria had 
better justifcation in one condition or the other.
Following the story, participants answered two com­
prehension  questions,  followed  by  a  question  about 
what Maria should say (the test question). These were 
the questions, with response options in brackets:
1. Is  there a 1990 Rolex Submariner in Maria’s 
collection? [Yes/No]
2. If  Maria  tells  her  guest  that  she  has  a  1990 
Rolex Submariner in her collection, she will be 
saying something _____. [True/False]
3. Should Maria tell her guest that she has a 1990 
Rolex Submariner in her collection? [Yes/No]
The questions were always asked in the same order. 
Response options were presented in random order. The 
questions appeared on a single screen and the story re­
mained  at  the  top  of  the  screen  throughout.  Parti­
cipants could change their answers while they remained 
on  the  screen.  After  testing,  participants  flled  out  a 
brief  demographic questionnaire. These same proced­
ures were also used in each of  the experiments reported 
below.
2.2. Results and discussion
Response to  the test question — about whether Maria 
should tell her guest that the watch is in her collection 
— will tell us whether participants share the non­factiv­
ity  intuition.  If  they  share  the  non­factivity  intuition, 
then participant response probably won’t differ between 
False and True conditions. The mere fact that the asser­
tion would be false shouldn’t change their estimation of 
whether  Maria  should  make  it.  By  contrast,  if  they 
share the factivity intuition, then they will probably an­
swer that Maria should not make the assertion in the 
False condition more than in the True condition.
There  was  a  signifcant  effect  of  condition:  over 
80% of  participants in the False condition responded 
that Maria should not make the statement compared to 
only 3% in the True condition, Fisher’s exact test,  p < 
0.001,  all  tests  two­tailed  unless  otherwise  noted. 
Moreover,  participants  in True responded that  Maria 
should  make  the  statement  at  rates  far  greater  than 
would  be  expected  by  chance,  just  as  participants  in 
False  said that  she should not  make  the  statement  at 
rates  far  greater  than  chance,  binomial,  both  ps  < 
0.001. This pattern is what we would expect if  parti­
cipants shared the factivity intuition but it’s not what we 
would expect if  they shared the non­factivity intuition.
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It might be objected that although Maria is well jus­
tifed in thinking that she has a 1990 Rolex in her col­
lection,  the comprehension questions focused only  on 
truth­related matters, neglecting whether she was justi­
fed. Perhaps this led participants to ignore the fact that 
Maria is justifed, which explains why participants failed 
to respond as non­factive accounts would predict. The 
next experiment addresses this concern.
3. Experiment 1B
What  would  happen  if,  before  asking  participants  to 
evaluate whether Maria should make the assertion, we 
asked  them only one question about Maria’s justifca­
tion, or only one question about what’s true in the case, 
or no question at all about either of  those things? In­
vestigating this will affect how we should interpret the 
results from Experiment 1A. If  changing or eliminating 
the  question  results  in  participants  answering  that 
Maria should make the false but well justifed assertion, 
then that will provide some relief  for non­factivists. But 
if  it doesn’t result in that, then it will provide them only 
more grief. So which will it be: relief  or grief ?
3.1. Participants, materials and procedure
Ninety­two  new  participants  (26  female,  aged  18–65 
years,  M = 27,  SD = 9.5  years,  98%  native  English 
speakers) were randomly assigned to one of  three con­
ditions:  No  Question,  Reason  Question,  and  Truth 
Question.
All participants read the False version of  the story 
in  Experiment  1A.  Conditions  differed  in  how parti­
cipants  were  questioned.  Following  the  story,  in  the 
Reason Question condition, participants were asked,
It is _____ for Maria to think that she has a 
1990 Rolex Submariner in her collection. [reas­
onable/unreasonable]
followed by the test question,
Should Maria tell her guest that she has a 1990 
Rolex Submariner in her collection? [Yes/No]
In  the  Truth  Question  condition,  participants were 
asked,
Is  there a 1990 Rolex Submariner in Maria's 
collection? [Yes/No]
followed by the test question. Participants in No Ques­
tion were asked only the test question.
Participants in all conditions were then taken to a 
separate screen (they could not go back and change pre­
vious answers at this point), where they were asked,
When you were deciding whether Maria should 
tell  her guest that she has a 1990 Rolex Sub­
mariner in her collection, which factor seemed 
more  important  to  you?  [Maria’s  evidence 
about  what  was  in  her  collection/The  truth 
about what was in her collection]
The purpose of  asking this question is to see whether 
participants are able to reflectively identify the criteria 
guiding their  evaluation of  an assertion.  Previous  re­
search on  moral evaluation has found that participants 
are sometimes very unreliable at identifying the criteria 
that  guide  their  moral  assessments  (Cushman,  Young 
and Hauser 2006).
3.2. Results and discussion
We want to know whether the earlier results favoring 
factive accounts were at least partly due to the way par­
ticipants  were  questioned.  If  they  were,  then  there 
probably will be an effect of  condition on participant 
response  in  the  present  experiment.  If  they  weren’t, 
then there probably won’t be an effect of  condition.
There was no effect of  condition on participant re­
sponse,  χ2(2) = 3,  p = 0.223. Moreover, participants in 
each condition answered that Maria should not make 
the assertion at rates exceeding what we would expect 
by chance: 68% in Reason Question, 80% in No Ques­
tion, and 86% in Truth Question, binomial, all ps≤.05. 
It is especially noteworthy that participants in Reason 
Question answered ‘No’ at  rates greater than chance. 
Even when asked only about Maria’s justifcation, parti­
cipants still  think that she should not make the asser­
tion. This is diffcult to explain if  assertion’s norm isn’t 
factive but easily explained if  it is factive.
Participant  assessment  of  what  mattered more in 
their evaluation of  the case, evidence or truth, didn’t 
differ from their answer to whether Maria should make 
the false but well justifed assertion, McNemar’s test,  p 
= 0.508. That is, participants who answered that Maria 
should make  the assertion strongly  tended to identify 
evidence  as  mattering  more,  and  participants  who 
answered  that  Maria  should  not  make  the  assertion 
strongly  tended  to  identify  truth  as  mattering  more. 
Among those who said that Maria should make the as­
sertion, 85% said that evidence mattered more. Among 
those who said that Maria should not make the asser­
tion, 92% said that truth mattered more. Overall, 75% 
of  participants said that truth mattered more, which far 
exceeds what could be expected by chance, binomial, p 
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< 0.001. These results suggest that participants are able 
to reliably report the criteria guiding their evaluation of 
assertions, at least on the most basic way of  soliciting 
such reports.
One concern about both of  the experiments up un­
til now is that some participants might be answering the 
test  question negatively  even though they  don’t  think 
that the norm of  assertion is factive. For instance, per­
haps some participants think that the norm of  assertion 
is non­factive but they also think that a false statement 
by Maria might have negative consequences. Further­
more,  some  of  these  participants  might  reasonably 
think that avoiding the negative consequences trumps 
whatever the norm of  assertion permits. Accentuating 
this  concern  is  the  fact  that  the  test  question  asks 
whether Maria should ‘tell her guest’ that she has the 
watch  in  her  collection.  It’s  a  legitimate  worry  that 
some participants answered the test question negatively 
because they think that hosts,  qua hosts, must tell their 
guests only truths. This is consistent with their thinking 
that assertors,  qua assertors, are not required to assert 
only truths. The next experiment addresses these con­
cerns.
4. Experiment 2
This  experiment  aims  to  address  the  concerns  men­
tioned at the end of  the previous section by doing two 
things. First, it varies how serious are the implied con­
sequences of  a false assertion by Maria. Second, the test 
question  doesn’t  ask  whether  Maria  ‘should  tell  her 
guest’ something but instead whether she ‘should say’ it 
in response to people in different relationships to her. If 
the concerns raised at the end of  the previous section 
are valid, then as the potential negative consequences of 
a false assertion rise, participants probably will be more 
likely to say that Maria should not make the assertion. 
By  contrast,  if  participant  response  is  keyed  to  the 
norms of  assertion specifcally  — rather than, say, the 
norms of  prudent action — then participants probably 
won’t be more likely to do that.
4.1. Participants, materials and procedure
One  hundred  and  fve  new  participants  (36  female, 
aged 18–63 years,  M = 31.18,  SD = 10.01 years, 99% 
native English speakers) were randomly assigned to one 
of  three conditions: Low, Medium, and High.
Participants in each condition read a variation on 
the  False  version  of  the  story  from Experiment  1A. 
Maria is no longer hosting guests for dinner but instead 
is simply asked a question by people in different capa­
cities and for different purposes. In story for the Low 
condition, Maria’s neighbor asks her a question out of 
idle  curiosity, so the implied cost of  speaking falsely is 
low. In the story for Medium, an insurance appraiser 
asks Maria a question in order to assess her collection’s 
value, so the implied cost of  speaking falsely is higher 
but  not intimidating.  In the story for High,  a federal 
prosecutor asks Maria a question as part of  an investig­
ation, so the implied cost of  speaking falsely is high.
After reading the story, participants in all conditions 
were asked two questions. First, they were asked the test 
question:
Should  Maria say that  she does  have a 1990 
Rolex Submariner in her collection? [Yes/No]
Then they were taken to a separate screen (they could 
not go back and change their previous answer), where 
they were asked,
When you were deciding whether Maria should 
tell  her guest that she has a 1990 Rolex Sub­
mariner in her collection, which factor seemed 
more  important  to  you?  [Maria’s  evidence 
about  what  was  in  her  collection/The  truth 
about what was in her collection]
4.2. Results and discussion
We’re primarily interested in whether there is an effect 
of  condition on response to the test question. If  there is, 
then it complicates the interpretation of participant re­
sponse to the test question. More specifcally, to the ex­
tent that participants answer negatively more frequently 
as the perceived costs of  speaking falsely rise, it com­
plicates  the  interpretation  of  earlier  results  favoring 
factive accounts. By contrast, if  there is no effect of  per­
ceived cost  of  error  on response to the test  question, 
then that lends support to my earlier interpretation of 
the  fndings  in Experiments  1A and 1B. In line with 
that,  I made two predictions about the results for the 
present experiment. First,  there would be no effect of 
condition on response to the test question. Second, par­
ticipants  would  once  again  tend  to  say  that  Maria 
should not make the false but well justifed assertion.
Both predictions were true. First, there was no ef­
fect of  condition on response to the test question, χ2(2) 
= 0.655,  p = 0.721. Higher implied costs of  speaking 
falsely did not lead participants to more frequently an­
swer that Maria should not speak falsely. Second, over­
all 70% of  participants answered that Maria should not 
make the false but well justifed assertion, which far ex­
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ceeds what could be expected by chance, binomial, p < 
0.001, and replicates the result from Experiment 1B, bi­
nomial, p = 0.095, test proportion = 0.77. What’s more, 
participants answered this way in each of  the three con­
ditions:  71% in  Low,  65% in  Medium,  and  74% in 
High, binomial,  ps≤.049, one­tailed. (A one­tailed test 
was used here because,  based on previous results, the 
prediction was directional.)
Once  again,  participant  assessment  of  what 
mattered more in their evaluation of  the case, evidence 
or  truth,  didn’t  differ  from  their  answer  to  whether 
Maria should make the false but well justifed assertion, 
McNemar’s test, p = 0.774. Among those who said that 
Maria should make the assertion, 83% said that evid­
ence mattered more. Among those who said that Maria 
should  not  make  the  assertion,  91%  said  that  truth 
mattered more. Overall, 71% of  participants said that 
truth mattered more, which far exceeds what could be 
expected by chance, binomial, p < 0.001. As we saw in 
Experiment  1B,  participants  seemingly  are  able  to 
identify the criteria guiding their evaluation.
Altogether  the  results  from our frst  three experi­
ments  provide evidence for at  least  three conclusions. 
First,  the  non­factivity  intuition  is  not  widely  shared. 
Second,  by  contrast,  the  factivity  intuition  is  widely 
shared. It appears that roughly 3/4 of  people respond 
as a factive account would predict, whereas roughly 1/4 
of  people respond consistently with the non­factivity in­
tuition.  An  assertion’s  truth­value  signifcantly  affects 
how most people evaluate it. Third, people’s evaluation 
of  assertion is, to a surprising extent, insensitive to the 
implied  costs  of  speaking  falsely.  Whether  Maria’s 
neighbor  asks out of  idle curiosity or a federal prosec­
utor asks in the course of  an investigation, participants 
were equally likely  to  answer  that  Maria  should  not 
make a false but well justifed assertion.
These results  could be strengthened by observing 
similar patterns using a different  dependent  measure. 
All  the experiments  thus far  collected responses  on a 
forced­choice  dichotomous  scale.  But  perhaps  this 
method of  questioning masks important differences that 
will be revealed if  participants are given greater flexibil­
ity to express themselves. The next experiment pursues 
this possibility.
Table 1: Percentage of  participants in Experiments 1A, 1B, 
and 2 who answered that Maria should not make a well justi­
fed but false assertion.
Should Not
Experiment 1A
     True 3
     False 80
Experiment 1B
     Reason Question 68
     No Question 80
     Truth Question 86
Experiment 2
     Low 71
     Medium 65
     High 74
5. Experiment 3
This experiment explores the robustness  of  the  main 
fndings from the frst three experiments. It does this by 
using a different method of  questioning to detect sim­
ilar patterns in participant response.
5.1. Participants, materials and procedure
One hundred new participants (25 female, aged 18–64 
years,  M = 29.35,  SD = 10.31 years, 97% native Eng­
lish speakers)  were  randomly  assigned to one of  four 
conditions in a 2 (Cost: Low/High) × 2 (Truth­value: 
True/False)  between­subjects  design.  Participants  in 
each condition read one story.
The Truth­value factor varies whether the invent­
ory correctly lists that Maria owns the watch. The Cost 
factor varies the implied costs of  a false statement from 
Maria. In the story for Low True, Maria’s neighbor asks 
her a question ‘just out of  idle curiosity,’ Maria consults 
her inventory, and the inventory accurately lists that she 
owns the watch. In the story for High True, a federal 
prosecutor asks Maria a question ‘for purposes of  an in­
vestigation,’ and the inventory accurately lists that she 
owns the watch. The stories for the Low False and High 
False conditions are the same except that the inventory 
is wrong when it lists that she owns the watch. Other­
wise, the storyline was the same as in previous experi­
ments reported above.
After reading the story, participants were asked to 
9  |  John Turri
rate their agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement: Maria should say that she does have a 1990 
Rolex  Submariner  in  her  collection.  Responses  were 
collected  on 7­point  scale,  anchored at  Strongly  Dis­
agree through Strongly Agree.  Responses were coded 
from  ­3  (Strongly  Disagree)  through  +3  (Strongly 
Agree), creating a midpoint of  0 (Neutral). (Participants 
never  saw  numerical  values,  only  the  qualitative  de­
scriptions.)
5.2. Results and discussion
The  main  fndings  from  the  frst  three  experiments 
were:  the non­factivity  intuition is  not  widely shared, 
the factivity intuition is widely shared, and raising the 
implied costs of  speaking falsely doesn’t affect people’s 
evaluation of  assertions. The previous experiments col­
lected  responses  from participants  using  dichotomous 
scales.  The present  experiment  tests whether  we also 
observe those outcomes when participants have greater 
flexibility  to  express  themselves.  If  we  don’t  observe 
similar outcomes in this experiment, then it complicates 
my interpretation of  earlier fndings. If  we do observe 
similar outcomes, then it supports my interpretation of 
earlier fndings. 
In line with the earlier fndings, I made two predic­
tions. First, there would be an effect of  Truth­value on 
participant  response.  More  specifcally,  participants 
would be inclined to agree with the statement in True 
conditions but inclined to disagree in the False condi­
tions. Second, there would be no effect of  Cost on par­
ticipant  response.  That  is,  response  in  Low  True 
wouldn’t  differ  from response  in  High  True,  and  re­
sponse in Low False  wouldn’t  differ from response in 
High False.
Both predictions were true.  A two­way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) revealed that there was an overall 
effect of  condition on response to the test question, F(3) 
= 26.12, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.449. There was a main ef­
fect  of  Truth­value,  F(1)  =  77.75,  p <  0.001,  ηp2 = 
0.447, but there was no effect of  Cost, F(1) = 0.37, p = 
0.547, and no interaction, F(1) = 0.233, p = 0.630. The 
mode in Low False was ‘Disagree’; the mode in High 
False  was  ‘Disagree’;  the  mode  in  Low  True  was 
‘Strongly Agree’; the mode in High True was ‘Strongly 
Agree’.  Pairwise  comparisons  using  independ­
ent­samples t­tests revealed that participant response in 
Low False (M = ­.48,  SD = 1.92) didn’t differ from re­
sponse in High False  (M = ­.84,  SD = 1.99),  t(48)  = 
0.651, p = 0.518; similarly, response in Low True (M = 
2.28, SD = 1.31) didn’t differ signifcantly from response 
in High True (M = 2.24, SD = 1.27), t(48) = 0.110, p = 
0.913. Because  Cost entered into no main or interac­
tion effects, I collapsed across that factor to gain statist­
ical power. Participant response in True conditions was 
signifcantly above the midpoint (M = 2.26, SD = 1.28), 
t(49) = 12.34, p < 0.001, whereas response in False con­
ditions was signifcantly below the midpoint (M = ­.66, 
SD = 1.94), t(49) = ­2.4, p = 0.020.
These  results  provide  additional  support  for  the 
three main fndings from previous experiments.  Once 
again, the truth­value of  a proposition signifcantly af­
fected people’s evaluation of  whether it should be asser­
ted. Participants strongly agreed that a well justifed true 
assertion should be made, but they tended to disagree 
that  a  well  justifed  false assertion  should  be  made. 
Moreover,  once again,  participant  response wasn’t  af­
fected by the implied cost of  speaking falsely. Taken to­
gether  these  results  corroborate  earlier  fndings  that 
participant  response  is  keyed  to  the  ‘should’  of  as­
sertoric  normativity  (as  opposed  to  prudential  norm­
ativity),  that  the  non­factivity  intuition  is  not  widely 
shared, and that the factivity intuition is widely shared.
6. Experiment 4
One concern about all the experiments up until now is 
that I have only  tested people’s intuitions about asser­
tions of  positive claims (i.e.  claims that something is the 
case).  I have not tested people’s intuitions about asser­
tions of  negative claims (i.e.  claims that something is  not 
the case). But if  the norm of  assertion is factive, then it 
is factive regardless of  whether  the assertion is positive 
or  negative.  Thus  the  results  so far could  be 
strengthened  by  investigating  whether  an  assertion’s 
content (positive/negative)  affects  people’s  intuitions 
about whether it should be made.
Another concern about the experiments thus far is 
that I haven’t given participants enough flexibility of  the  
right  sort to register what they think Maria should say. 
They were forced to either answer a dichotomous ques­
tion about whether Maria should make a certain asser­
tion,  or  to  rate  their  agreement  with  the  claim  that 
Maria should make the assertion. Narrowly focusing on 
one  particular  “should”  question  or  statement might 
prevent participants from meaningfully expressing their 
view  of  Maria’s  situation.  For  instance, even  though 
participants  defnitely  tend to say that  Maria “should 
not” make a justifed false assertion, we still don’t know 
what they think she should say in such a situation. The 
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results so far could be strengthened by allowing parti­
cipants  to  directly  select  from multiple  options  what 
Maria should say.
This experiment addresses both of  these concerns. 
On the one hand, it tests whether the effect of  truth on 
assertability is similar for positive and negative claims. 
On the  other  hand,  it  gives participants  much  more 
flexibility to select what Maria should say.
6.1. Participants, materials and procedure
One hundred sixteen new participants (33 female, aged 
18–62 years,  M = 28.45,  SD = 8.73 years, 96% native 
English  speakers)  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of 
four conditions in a 2 (Content: Positive/Negative) × 2 
(Truth­value: True/False) between­subjects design.
Participants in each condition read one story.  The 
basic story was the same as the Low cost story from Ex­
periment  3  (Maria’s  neighbor  asking  her  about  the 
watch  out  of  curiosity).  The  Content factor  varies 
whether the inventory lists that Maria does/doesn’t own 
the watch. The Truth­value factor varies whether  the 
inventory is correct or incorrect.
After  reading the  story,  participants  were asked a 
single question:  How should Maria answer her neigh­
bor’s  question? Participants  were given seven options, 
displayed left­to­right across their screen.  The options 
varied whether and how strongly Maria should claim or 
deny that the watch is in her collection. In conditions 
where  the  inventory  says  that  Maria  does  have  the 
watch (Positive conditions),  participants chose from the 
following options, left­to­right:
"I defnitely do have one."
"I do have one."
"I probably do have one."
"It's unclear."
"I probably don't have one."
"I don't have one."
"I defnitely don't have one."
In conditions where the inventory says that Maria does 
not have the watch (Negative conditions),  participants 
chose from the same options in reverse order, beginning 
with “I defnitely don’t have one” on the left, through “I 
defnitely do have one” on the right.
Responses were coded from left­to­right, +3 (Maria 
should say that things are  defnitely  as the inventory in­
dicates)  through  ­3 (Maria  should say that  things are 
defnitely  not  as the inventory indicates),  with a neutral 
midpoint of  0 (“It’s unclear”). (Participants never saw 
numerical  values,  only  the  qualitative  descriptions.) 
Thus coding for specifc responses was reversed in Posit­
ive and Negative conditions (except for the neutral mid­
point, which was the same in both),  creating a consist­
ent measure of  how strongly Maria should assert in ac­
cordance with, or against, the evidence provided by the 
inventory.
6.2. Results and discussion
We want to learn two things from this study. First, were 
earlier  results  favoring  factive accounts  at  least  partly 
due to the fact that the stimuli featured only positive as­
sertions, or will participants will view negative assertions 
similarly? If  participants view negative assertions simil­
arly, then there probably won’t be a main effect of  Con­
tent on response to the test question. Second, how will 
participants respond when they are empowered to more 
flexibly express themselves?  Of  special interest is what 
participants think Maria should say when she has a jus­
tifed false belief  about the contents of  her collection.
A  two­way ANOVA revealed  that  there  was  an 
overall effect of  condition on response to the test ques­
tion, F(3) = 27.64, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.425. There was a 
main effect of  Truth­value, F(1) = 82.12, p < 0.001,  ηp2 
= 0.423,  but  there  was  no  effect  of  Content,  F(1)  = 
0.762, p = 0.385, and no interaction, F(1) = 0.041, p = 
0.841.  Pairwise  comparisons  using  independ­
ent­samples t­tests revealed that the mean response in 
True  Positive  (M =  2.0,  SD =  1.3)  was  signifcantly 
higher than in False Positive (M = ­.28, SD = 1.71), t(56) 
= 5.69, p < 0.001; similarly, the mean response in True 
Negative  (M =  2.28,  SD =  0.649)  was  signifcantly 
higher than in False Negative  (M = ­.10,  SD = 1.61), 
t(56) = 7.38, p < 0.001. The mode in both True Positive 
and  True  Negative  was  +2,  indicating  that  Maria 
should flat­out assert the true and well justifed claim. 
The mode in both False Positive and False Negative was 
+1,  indicating that Maria should say that the justifed 
false claim is probably true. Figure 1 visualizes the distri­
bution of  responses in the four conditions.
These  results  further  support a  factive  account. 
Once again,  an assertion’s truth­value signifcantly af­
fected how people evaluate it, regardless of  whether its 
content is positive or negative. And when given greater 
flexibility to indicate what should be said about a justi­
fed false proposition, very few participants said that the 
proposition should be flat­out asserted.  In False condi­
tions,  the most  common  response  was  that  Maria 
should assert that the justifed false proposition is “prob­
ably” true,  although surprising number of participants 
also said that Maria should assert against her evidence in 
order to speak the truth. By contrast, almost all parti­
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cipants said that a justifed true proposition should be 
either asserted or emphatically asserted.
It’s  worth noting that,  on the  most  natural  inter­
pretation, the assertion “I probably do (not) have one” 
is  arguably true even when the flat­out assertion “I do 
(not) have one” is false, given what Maria knows about 
the inventory’s reliability. In other words, Maria’s evid­
ence can make it true that probably she does (not) have the  
watch even when it’s false that she does (not) have one. Thus, 
in cases of  justifed false belief, the most common view 
is that Maria should make a true probabilistic assertion, 
though the bimodal distribution of  responses  suggests 
that  this  view  is not  uncontroversial. By  contrast,  in 
cases of  justifed true belief, nearly everyone agrees that 
she should make the true flat­out assertion, without any 
hedging or probabilistic qualifcation.
7. Experiment 5: rule-breaking and excuse 
validation
Recall that the second objection to factive accounts is a 
simple  argument  about  justifed  false  assertions:  a 
speaker  who  makes  a  justifed  false  assertion  is  not 
thereby properly criticizable (or:  blameworthy);  so the 
speaker has probably not broken a rule of  assertion; so 
assertion probably doesn’t have a factive norm. The ar­
Figure 1:  Experiment 4: Distribution of  responses across the four conditions: True Positive: the inventory correctly lists that 
Maria owns the watch; True Negative: the inventory correctly lists that Maria doesn’t own the watch; False Positive: the invent­
ory incorrectly lists that Maria owns the watch; False Negative: the inventory incorrectly lists that Maria does not own the  
watch. Values along the x­axis represent what Maria “should” say: 3 = the inventory is “defnitely” right; 2 = the inventory is  
right; 1 = the inventory is “probably” right; 0 = it’s “unclear”; ­1 = the inventory is “probably” wrong; ­2 = the inventory is  
wrong; ­3 = the inventory is “defnitely” wrong.
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gument assumes that blamelessness is a defeasibly good 
indication that no rule has been broken. (Its proponents 
aren’t committed to blamelessness being an indefeasible 
indication that no rule has been broken.) Granting that 
assumption for the sake of  argument,  this section re­
ports an experiment that defeats its application to justi­
fed false assertions. The results arguably also discredit 
the assumption itself  — not  merely its application in 
the present case — but that is a more ambitious claim 
that must be developed elsewhere.
7.1. Excuse validation
Humans are sensitive to criticism for doing what is, by 
their lights, the right thing, even when it turns out to 
have  been  the  wrong  thing.  Of  course,  we  can  be 
brought to see the error of  our ways, but as we all know 
from experience, it can be challenging to admit to fail­
ure and wrongdoing, especially when someone criticizes 
or blames us.
We make allowance for this human sensibility in our 
dealings with others. We’re often willing to excuse or even 
overlook what is  in fact incorrect behavior if  the trans­
gressor had good evidence for thinking that their behavior 
was  correct.  If,  from  your  perspective,  you  should  do 
something, then it  can easily seem harsh to criticize or 
blame you for doing it. And it seems even harsher yet to 
punish you for it.3 A more natural and generous reaction 
is to try to help you improve your perspective so that it 
better matches what is in fact proper behavior. But some­
times even  that much can seem like an imposition and 
we’re willing to let further experience and reflection teach 
the transgressor his lesson in the fullness of  time. What’s 
more, sometimes we feel compelled to go so far as to insist 
that  the transgressor  “did nothing wrong.” Such is  the 
pressure  we’re  prone  to  feel  in  the  face  of  blameless 
wrongdoing. Call this the human tendency of  excuse valida­
tion.  (A related phenomenon, “blame validation,” is dis­
cussed by Alicke 1992 and Alicke & Rose 2010.)
If  excuse validation occurs, then it complicates the ar­
gument  advanced by non­factivists  earlier  in  section 3. 
Non­factivists noted that a speaker isn’t properly criticiz­
able for a false justifed assertion, and concluded that a 
rule hadn’t been broken. But we should be cautious about 
this inference. Our view on whether someone deserves cri­
ticism can affect whether we’re willing to say, or perhaps 
even think, that a rule has been broken. If  we want to 
3 Actually, criticism and blame are mild forms of  punish­
ment.  But  ‘punish’  connotes  something  much  more 
severe, beyond mere verbal punishment. 
reason from an intuition of  blamelessness to the conclu­
sion that no rule had been broken, then excuse validation 
is a factor that needs to be controlled for.
This section looks more carefully at the potential rela­
tionship between excuse validation and non­factivity intu­
itions about assertion. Although the motivation for non­
factive accounts is real and, for some, irresistible, I suspect 
that it is not keyed directly to the norm of  assertion. In­
stead it is keyed to our commitment to derivative prin­
ciples  of  criticism for  excusable  violations,  which fts  a 
more general pattern. In short, the appeal of  non­factiv­
ism is an expression of  a tendency to excuse validation.
The relevance of  distinguishing between correctness 
and blamelessness  — or  closely  related  distinctions  — 
hasn’t  been lost  on proponents of  factive accounts (e.g. 
Williamson 2000:  256,  DeRose 2002:  180).  But  earlier 
treatments have met with sustained criticism (e.g. Lackey 
2007, Kvanvig 2009) and have not been developed in de­
tail or with an eye toward empirical confrmation. Here I 
advance the discussion by identifying the phenomenon of 
excuse validation, experimentally establishing an approx­
imate baseline frequency, and experimentally establishing 
that participant response to cases of  justifed false asser­
tions fts the observed pattern of  excuse validation. This 
places a considerable burden on non­factivitsts who want 
to persist in arguing against factive accounts from premises 
about blamelessness.
7.2. Participants, materials and procedure
Sixty­fve new participants (23 female, aged 18–54 years, 
M = 27,  SD = 9.4 years, 97% native English speakers) 
were randomly assigned to one of  two conditions: Driving 
and Asserting. I excluded data from twenty­seven addi­
tional participants who failed comprehension questions.
Participants read one story about either a driver who 
blamelessly breaks the speed limit, or about a speaker who 
blamelessly makes a false statement. To accentuate their 
blamelessness, each protagonist’s rule­breaking is saliently 
caused by the actions of  another person in the story. After 
the  story,  participants  were  asked  four  comprehension 
questions, then two test questions: whether the protagonist 
is criticizable for their behavior, and whether there is a 
sense in which the protagonist’s behavior is incorrect.
Here are the story and questions for the Driving con­
dition:
Doreen just had her car serviced and is driving 
home from the mechanic's shop. She wants to get 
home without unnecessary delay, but she does not 
want to break the speed limit. The speed limit is 
55 miles per hour, so she looks down to see how 
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fast she is going. The speedometer says that she is 
going 55 miles per hour. But the speedometer is 
wrong, since the mechanic disrupted a setting on 
the speedometer without anyone noticing. As a 
result,  Doreen  is  actually  driving  60  miles  per 
hour. 
D1. How fast does Doreen think she is driving? 
[50/55/60]
D2. Is it reasonable for Doreen to think that she is 
driving that fast? [Yes/No]
D3. How fast is Doreen driving? [50/55/60]
D4. Is Doreen’s speed above the limit? [Yes/No]
D5. Should Doreen be criticized for driving that 
speed? [Yes/No]
D6. Is there a sense in which it is incorrect for 
Doreen to drive that speed? [Yes/No]
Here are the story and questions for the Asserting condi­
tion.
Robert just purchased an 1804 US silver dollar 
and is placing it in a display in his library. He is 
having dinner guests over tonight, and he wants 
to tell them about the silver dollar. He sets the sil­
ver dollar in its display, closes the library doors be­
hind him, and goes to greet his guests. Soon after, 
as Robert serves his guests dinner, he tells them, 
“There is an 1804 US silver dollar in my library.” 
But between the time Robert left his library and 
the time he served dinner, a coin thief  quickly 
slipped through his library window, stole the silver 
dollar, and escaped without anyone noticing. As a 
result, Robert's coin is not in the library.
A1. Where does Robert think his coin is located? 
[in the library/in the thief ’s possession]
A2. Is  Robert’s  belief  about  the  coin’s  location 
reasonable? [Yes/No]
A3. Where is Robert’s coin? [in the library/in the 
thief's possession]
A4. Is Robert’s statement false? [Yes/No]
A5. Should Robert be criticized for making that 
statement? [Yes/No]
A6. Is there a sense in which it is incorrect for 
Robert to make that statement? [Yes/No]
7.3. Results and discussion
The purpose of  the Driving condition is to establish an 
approximate base rate for excuse validation. That is, re­
sponses in this condition help set a baseline for how fre­
quently we can expect participants to react to what obvi­
ously is real but blameless objective rule­breaking by not merely 
excusing it, but by going so far as to  deny that the trans­
gressor behaved in incorrectly in any sense.
It is a plain fact of  the case that Doreen is breaking 
the speed limit: she is driving 60 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h 
zone. Indeed, it was a comprehension question whether 
Doreen was  driving  above  the  limit  (i.e.  question  D4). 
Only participants who answered ‘Yes’ were included in 
the analysis. But it is also obvious that Doreen lacks evid­
ence that she is breaking the speed limit, and indeed that 
she has excellent evidence that her driving speed is legal. 
So of  course she should not be criticized, much less tick­
eted,  for  breaking  the  speed  limit.  Her  objective  rule­
breaking is blameless and fully excusable. Or so it can eas­
ily seem.
In light of  all that, I predicted that many participants 
would engage in excuse validation by answering ‘No’ to 
question D6 — that is, by denying that Doreen’s driving 
speed is incorrect in any sense. And this is exactly what we 
observe. Only 49% answered that there was a sense in 
which it was incorrect for Doreen to drive that fast, which 
doesn’t differ signifcantly from what could be expected by 
chance, binomial,  p>.99. This is a very surprising result, 
especially  given  that  only  participants  who  correctly 
answered comprehension question D4 (‘Is Doreen’s speed 
above the limit?’) were included in the analysis. This is no 
doubt related to the fact that 97% answered that Doreen 
should not be criticized for driving that speed.
I predicted that we would see a similar response pat­
tern in the Asserting condition. Again, this is exactly what 
we observe. Participants responded to the two test ques­
tions very similarly in both Asserting and Driving condi­
tions (Fisher’s, both  ps>.95, two­tailed). In the Asserting 
condition, 96% said that Robert shouldn’t be criticized, 
and only 46% answered that there was a sense in which it 
was incorrect for him to make the statement.
What  could  explain  this  striking  similarity?  The 
best explanation is that protagonists in both stories en­
gage in blameless and excusable rule­breaking, and that 
a predictable proportion of  participants in both condi­
tions react to this by engaging in excuse validation: they 
literally deny that any transgression has occurred, even 
though they recognize — and had just agreed! — that it 
has.  Given  the  similarities  of  structure  and  content 
between Driving  and Asserting,  it  must  then  be  that 
making a false statement breaks a relevant and salient rule 
in Asserting just as driving over the speed limit breaks a rel­
evant and salient rule in Driving. In other words, a fact­
ive norm of  assertion is part of  the best explanation of 
the observed similarities in response patterns.
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I want to be clear about how I’m marshaling this 
data into an argument against non­factive accounts. Ex­
cuse validation occurs when people detect that a certain 
action breaks a rule, note that it was broken blamelessly, 
and  then  deny  that  the  transgressor  broke  the  rule. 
People tend to engage in excuse validation at a certain 
rate, but this rate can’t be gleaned from the armchair. 
Participant response in Driving helps to establish an ap­
proximate base rate experimentally. The response pat­
tern in Asserting doesn’t differ from the pattern in Driv­
ing.4 This similarity is striking and cries out for explana­
tion.  One good explanation  for  this  similarity  is  that 
participants  in  Asserting  are  also  engaging  in  excuse 
validation at roughly that same rate. But in order for 
them to do that, they must think that a relevant rule has been  
broken.  Given  the  structure  of  Asserting  and  its  iso­
morphism to Driving, the  only plausible candidate for 
such a rule is a factive norm of  assertion. And this is 
further evidence in favor of  a factive norm of  assertion.
8. Conclusion
I accomplished two main things in this paper. First, I 
adopted an experimental approach to investigating the 
norms of  assertion, placing the discussion on surer em­
pirical ground and hopefully inspiring further work in 
an area ripe for experimental investigation. Second, I 
strengthened the case for a factive norm of  assertion.
Results from  six experiments support several con­
clusions. First, the non­factivity intuition is not widely 
shared (Experiments 1A, 1B, 2, 3, and 4). That is, most 
people do not judge that well justifed but false asser­
tions should be made. Second, the factivity intuition is 
widely shared (Experiments 1A, 3 and 4). That is, most 
people judge that false assertions should not be made, 
even when they are strongly supported by the available 
evidence. Third, people’s evaluation of  the assertions is 
keyed to assertoric normativity rather than, say, pruden­
tial normativity (Experiments 2 and 3). Fourth, people 
can reliably identify the criteria guiding their evaluation 
of  assertions  (Experiments  1B and  2).  Similar  results 
were  observed  across  several  experiments  that  ques­
tioned participants differently, including adding or elim­
inating  comprehension  questions,  collecting  responses 
4 In subsequent  work,  my lab has replicated this result 
multiple times. We have replicated it not only with stor­
ies involving driving, but with a range of  other activities 
too,  including  baking,  farming,  and  chess  (Turri  and 
Blouw, under review).
on different scales,  and changing the available options. 
Overall, a factive norm of  assertion well explains some 
rather  striking  patterns  in  people’s  reaction  to  cases. 
Moreover, intuitions that appear to conflict with a fact­
ive norm are arguably due to a general tendency to say 
that blameless transgressors did nothing incorrect (Ex­
periment 5).
Up until now, inquiry into the norms of  assertion 
has  been  broadly  observational  though  not  experi­
mental. But an experimental approach is warranted be­
cause competing theories about the norm of  assertion 
generate  testable  predictions,  given  two plausible  and 
widely shared assumptions.
The frst assumption is that the normative intuitions 
of  skilled practitioners are a source of  evidence about 
what the practice’s rules are. This assumption is argu­
ably shared by those who appeal to competent speakers’ 
intuitions to support theories of  syntax (e.g. Chomsky 
1965), experimental investigations into the adequacy of 
various theories of  the relationship between semantics 
and pragmatics, and other forms of  psycholinguistic ex­
perimentation (e.g. Gibbs and Moise 1997, and the es­
says in Noveck and Sperber 2004). Other things being 
equal, we should expect skilled practitioners to reliably 
identify what should and should not be done, what must 
and must  not  be  done according to the rules  of  the 
practice.
Importantly, this is not to say that skilled practition­
ers have an explicit, articulable theory about what the 
rules  are, or that they can reliably identify the actual 
rule(s) of  the practice when asked to select them from a 
set  competing  proposals.  The  assumption  is  not  that 
skilled practitioners tend to be good theorists; rather, it’s 
that patterns in their concrete, frst­order intuitions and 
judgments manifest their skill  in applying the relevant 
rules (Chomsky 1957).5 In short, their intuitive reaction 
to cases tends to manifest their competence, resulting in 
detectable  patterns.  We  can  then  use  these  patterns 
when theorizing about the practice’s rules. The patterns 
will make some proposals much less likely than others, 
5 Chomsky  (1957:  p.  97,  n.  5)  cautions  against 
‘replac[ing] an operational test of  behavior . . . by an 
informant’s  judgment about his  behavior.  The opera­
tional  tests  for linguistics  notions  may require the  in­
formant  to  respond,  but  not  to  express  his  opinion 
about  his  behavior,  his  judgments  about  synonymy, 
about phonetic distinctness, etc. The informant’s opin­
ions [about these things] may be based on all sorts of  ir­
relevant factors.’ Postulating a set of  rules to explain the 
observed linguistic behavior is the linguist’s job.
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given what we expect from skilled performance.
The second assumption is that assertion is a social 
practice that competent speakers are skilled at, which is 
utterly  uncontroversial.  Given  these  two assumptions, 
the normative intuitions of  competent speakers  are a 
valuable source of  evidence about the norms of  asser­
tion. Other things being equal,  if  that  group strongly 
tends to judge that assertions of  a certain sort should 
not be made, then we should conclude that those asser­
tions probably violate the norm of  assertion. Similar re­
marks  apply  when  investigating  the  norms  of  other 
speech acts, such as questioning, commanding, guaran­
teeing, promising, etc. The present discussion can thus 
serve as a model for investigating the norms of  other 
speech acts.
All  the  studies  reported  here  were  conducted  on 
adults in the United States. This is a noteworthy limita­
tion  and  future  research  could  proftably  investigate 
these  matters  cross­culturally  and  developmentally. 
First, is there cross­cultural variation in the evaluation 
of  assertions and informants? If  members of  other cul­
tures respond signifcantly differently to the same exper­
imental stimuli, then that would raise questions about 
how to interpret the results reported here, and indeed 
about  whether  there  is  a  universally  shared,  normat­
ively constituted practice of  assertion. Second, are there 
developmental  differences  in  the  evaluation  of  asser­
tions and informants? Do young children and adoles­
cents tend to view these matters differently from adults? 
If  so, at what point do the differences appear and disap­
pear?
In the process of  investigating the norms of  assertion, 
we  encountered a  surprising  and potentially  important 
pattern in people’s normative judgments about blameless 
rule­breaking:  excuse validation.  Experiment  5 suggests 
that  many people  are surprisingly  unwilling  to  identify 
blameless rule­breaking as rule­breaking. This raises a host 
of  interesting questions about the nature and function of 
rules in human society, as well as the relationship between 
rules, blame and punishment. Further work in this area 
could investigate the causes and limits of  excuse valida­
tion. For example, if  blamelessly breaking the rule has ser­
iously negative social consequences, then perhaps people 
will be more likely to correctly identify it as rule­breaking.
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